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Abstract
Essays on Monetary Policy at the Effective Lower Bound and with Financial
Disruption
by
Akatsuki Sukeda
This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters.
The first chapter analyzes the effectiveness of optimal sustainable forward guid-
ance at the effective lower bound when the economy faces occasional financial disrup-
tions. Financial disruptions make households and firms respond less to future monetary
shocks because of precautionary saving and the value of current profit increases. As a
result, the following three results emerge. First, forward guidance affects the current
economy much less strongly without changing its effect when the economy exits the
lower bound. Second, the effectiveness of forward guidance becomes weaker even if the
central bank has perfect credibility and commit to stronger forward guidance. Third,
since output gaps and inflation experience a larger deviation from the optimal level at
exit periods, credibility concerns make the effectiveness of optimal sustainable forward
guidance even weaker.
The second chapter analyzes the effectiveness of forward guidance in a low
natural rate of interest environment. Since the strength of forward guidance depends
on how lower and how many more periods the central bank will set the real interest
below the natural rate, a low natural rate environment makes the central bank commit to
vii
forward guidance with longer horizons to achieve the same effects on the current period.
This increases the cost of forward guidance at the exit periods because the deviation
from the optimal level becomes larger and lasts longer. As a result, the effectiveness
of forward guidance becomes weaker even if the central bank has perfect credibility.
Moreover, gaining credibility becomes harder and this even weakens the effectiveness of
forward guidance.
The third chapter analyzes how the effects of monetary policy depend on
the condition of the financial sector. With heterogeneous households in terms of the
marginal cost of working, there exist essential financial needs. When it is more costly for
the financial sector to extend lending than normal times, the effects of monetary policy
becomes smaller. The larger the households heterogeneity is, the smaller the effects
become. This is in sharp contrast with the case when there are no financial frictions
in that the households heterogeneity does not affect the effects of monetary policy with
the perfect financial market. The results also hold for forward guidance.
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Chapter 1
Credible Forward Guidance with
Financial Disruption
1.1 Introduction
Forward guidance, which is announcements by central banks on the future
policy interest rate, is an important monetary policy tool especially when the current
policy interest rate hit the effective lower bound. Although the effectiveness of forward
guidance in standard New Keynesian models is well understood, we do not know much
about the effectiveness of forward guidance under financial disruption. This is the first
paper which shows that the effectiveness of forward guidance might be smaller and
the credibility on whether the central bank keeps the promise matters under financial
disruption.
In standard New Keynesian models, forward guidance is powerful, and the
1
central bank almost never has the incentive to reneges on the promise on the future
policy rate. The key mechanism is that the output gap and the inflation rate in the
current period respond to expectations on the future economic outcome. This effect is so
strong that forward guidance has a larger effect when announced than when the actual
interest rate cut occurs, which is coined as forward guiance puzzle. Then, in a severe
recession which makes the effective lower bound binding, the central bank announces to
keep the nominal interest rate low for several periods even when the economy gets out
of the recession, and this has a huge expansionary effect without affecting the output
gaps and the inflation when the economy exits the effective lower bound.
Then, once the economy gets out of the recession, the central bank has a
strong incentive to keep the promise and set the interest rate low for several periods.
The central bank compares the cost and the benefit of keeping the forward guidance
announced previously to decide whether to reneges on the promise or not. The cost
comes from enduring slightly higher than the optimal level of the output gap and the
inflation rate for several periods. The benefit is being able to use forward guidance
again in the future recessions. Since the benefit is much larger than the cost, credibility
concern is less relevant.
However, when there is financial distress, there are several channels through
which the effects of forward guidance may change. First, when financial intermediaries
are in trouble, borrowing credit becomes much more difficult. Then at the current
period, those who want to borrow end up with low consumption. So the output gap
responds less to the change in current interest rate. Also, since those who want to lend
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today are afraid of having a hard time borrowing tomorrow, they consume less today
than when there are no borrowing concerns. So the current output gap responds less
to an increase in the future output gap. Second, firms also face problems in borrowing
credit. This means that the current profit matters more to reduce financial frictions.
Then, in response to an increase in the future inflation rate, firms are less inclined to
increase prices because it decreases the current profit.
To capture the importance of occasional financial crises, I use a linearized New
Keynesian model which behaves differently at the good state and the bad state. At
the good state, the economy is characterized by a standard New Keynesian model. At
the bad state, the output gap and the inflation rate respond less to future economic
outcomes compared to the good state. The economy switches between the good state
and the bad state following a Markov process, and agents in the economy correctly
understand the probability of the state switches.
When I analyze forward guidance in this model, three results emerge. First,
forward guidance affects the current economy much less strongly without changing its
effect when the economy exits the lower bound. How forward guidance affects the
current output gap and the inflation rate depends on how much these variables respond
to future shocks, and in the bad state, the economy responds less to future shocks.
However, at exit periods, when the central bank keeps the interest rate lower than the
optimal level because of forward guidance, the economy is at the good state, and the
economy responds future shocks as in a standard model.
Second, the effectiveness of forward guidance becomes weaker even if the cen-
3
tral bank has perfect credibility and commit to forward guidance with a longer horizon.
Because the effect of extending forward guidance for one more period becomes smaller,
the central bank wants to carry out forward guidance with longer horizons. However,
this makes the output gap and the inflation rate much higher than the optimal levels at
exit periods. As a result, even if the central bank is perfectly credible, the welfare gain
is much smaller. In the bench mark case, the welfare gain becomes 48% of a standard
case.
Third, credibility problems matters. When the effects of forward guidance are
weakened, since the economy experiences the larger deviation from the optimal level
at exit periods, the cost of committing to forward guidance becomes larger while the
future benefit of mitigating deep crises will be smaller. As a result, the effectiveness of
credible forward guidance becomes 33% of a standard case. The number becomes even
smaller if there is a possibility of regaining credibility when the central bank reneges on
the promise.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, the relevant literature on the
credibility of forward guidance and financial frictions are reviewed. Section 3 starts the
model and section 4 explains the main driver of the results. Section 5 derives equilib-
rium outcomes and Section 6 defines optimal forward guidance and optimal sustainable
forward guidance. Section 7 shows the results and section 8 concludes.
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1.2 Literature Review
Monetary policy at the effective lower bound was first analyzed by Krugman
(1998) in a two-period model and extended into infinite-horizon New Keynesian models
by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Jung et al. (2005). These papers point to
the result that even if central banks cannot lower interest rate today, committing to
keep interest rate lower in the future significantly expand the current economy without
incurring much cost once the economy gets out of recessions. Adam and Billi (2006)
and Nakov (2008) extend the models to incorporate anticipation of binding zero lower
bound in the future.
The monetary policy at the effective lower bound got renewed attention after
the Great Recession. McKay et al. (2016) analyzed a standard New Keynesian model
and showed that forward guidance is very powerful and an announcement of an interest
rate cut in distant future has a stronger effect on the current inflation. Del Negro et al.
(2015) showed that this powerful effects of forward guidance also exist in a medium-scale
New Keynesian model and coined it as forward guidance puzzle.
Since forward guidance is a commitment to future interest rate changes, the
effectiveness crucially depends on whether the policy is credible or not. Bodenstein et
al. (2012) relaxed the assumption of perfect credibility by assuming that the central
bank reneged on the promise with fixed probability and showed that the effectiveness of
forward guidance becomes smaller in this setup. One implication of the model is that
the central bank should commit to stronger forward guidance to overcome imperfect
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credibility. This implication also arises in the present paper. However, committing to
stronger forward guidance incur a larger cost at exiting periods and this hurts credibility.
This paper is the first which analyzes this channel in a monetary model where credibility
is fragile.
Nakata (2018) and Walsh (2018) relaxed the assumption of an exogenous prob-
ability of reneging by introducing endogenous credibility. The central bank reneges on
the promise whenever it leads to a smaller loss for the central bank. However, what they
showed is that in standard New Keynesian models, the credibility of forward guidance is
virtually perfect because forward guidance reduces the cost of severe recessions without
incurring much cost when the economy is out of recessions.
The implication of endogenous credibility of forward guidance may depend on
the models to be used because it changes the benefit and the cost of forward guidance.
So in this paper, I show that how the implication of credibility of forward guidance
change in a New Keynesian model which is intended to capture some aspects of the
Great Recession.1
But there are many aspects of the Great Recession. This paper singled out
financial distress which affects two parts of the model. First, financial intermediaries are
implicitly introduced in a similar way to Curdia and Woodford (2016) and Woodford
(2010). In normal times, financial intermediaries have a perfectly elastic intermedia-
1Very recently, Nakata et al. (forthcoming) analyze the optimal forward guidance under perfect
credibility using the discounted Euler equation and the discounted Phillips curve. However, they do
not analyze credibility. Nakata and Sunakawa (2019) analyze the optimal credible forward guidance
using a New Keynesian model with the discounted Phillips curve. Neither of the papers assumes state
dependent discounting.
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tion supply curve, but in crises periods, financial intermediation supply curve becomes
steeper. Second, firms who face financial frictions have to endure external finance pre-
mium as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
There are several papers which modify standard New Keynesian models in
such a way that the effectiveness of forward guidance is muted. McKay et al. (2016,
2017) introduce heterogeneous agents with borrowing constraints, and it also showed
that the model could be well approximated by a standard New Keynesian model with a
discounted Euler equation. Angeletos and Lian (2018) relaxes the common knowledge
assumption and introduce higher order uncertainty. Gabaix (2018) introduces bounded
rationality and showed that the economy is characterized by a discounted Euler equation
and a discounted New Keynesian Phillips Curve. Del Negro et al. (2015) introduced
agents with a finite life.
However, there are two differences between their papers and my paper. First,
only my paper attributes the discounted effects to financial disruption, which is the
cause of hitting the effective lower bound. Second, my paper assumes that additional
discounting occurs only at the crisis periods while their papers assume that additional
discounting occurs all the time and the degree does not depend on the state. As a result,
credibility plays a more significant role in my model. Also, in terms of calibration, to
reduce the effectiveness of forward guidance, the discounting has to be somewhat large,
so in their models, they have to claim that the degree of these modifications is large all
the time while my model requires that discounting is large only at the crisis periods.
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1.3 The Model
The basic structure of the model follows Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)
in that there are two aggregate states of the world.2 In addition, I assume that the
economy is characterized by the same linearized New Keynesian model as Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003) in the good state while the economy at the bad state is characterized by
a linearized New Keynesian model with additional discounting on the expected output
gap and the expected inflation. This is a model with financial disruption, and both
households and firms change their response to future shocks under financial disruption.
In the good state, the economy is characterized by the standard dynamic IS
curve and the New Keynesian Phillips curve,
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1 − rnt ) (1.1)
pit = βEtpit+1 + κxt, (1.2)
where xt is the output gap, it is the nominal interest rate, pit is the inflation rate, and
rnt is the natural rate of interest.
In the bad state, the economy is characterized by
xt = M1Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1 − rnt ) (1.3)
pit = βM2Etpit+1 + κxt. (1.4)
The two systems differ in three components. First, the natural rate of interest depends
on the aggregate state as in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). The natural rate of
2This structure is often used to analyze equilibrium at the effective lower bound on nominal interest
rates. See, for example, Nakata (2018) and Walsh (2018).
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interest rate is positive when the economy is in the good state and becomes negative
when the economy is in the bad state,
rnt =

ρ > 0 if the state is good
rz < 0 if the state is bad.
(1.5)
Second, there is a discounting term M1 < 1 in the dynamic IS curve. This
reduces how much the current output gap respond to the future output gaps. This cap-
tures a channel through which financial disruption affects households behavior. When
households are more afraid of potential low consumption in the next period, they want
to save more for the next period. As a result, when there is a positive shock to future
income, households increase consumption relatively less. When M1 = 1, the equation
is identical to the standard dynamic IS curve.
Third, there is an additional discounting term M2 < 1 in the New Keynesian
Phillips curve. This reduces how much the current inflation rate responds to the future
inflation rate. This captures a channel through which financial disruption affects firms
behavior. When firms face financial frictions, the value of current profit relative to future
profit becomes even more valuable because having higher net worth relaxes the financial
friction. When M2 = 1, the equation is identical to the standard New Keynesian Phillips
curve.
The economy switches between the two systems following the Markov process,
P ≡
 pgg pgb
pbg pbb
 =
 s 1− s
1− q q
 , (1.6)
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where pij with i ∈ {g, b}, j ∈ {g, b} is the probability of switching from the state i to
state j, and g stands for the good state and b stands for the bad state.
To close the model, we need to specify monetary policy, which will be discussed
in section 5.
1.4 Inspecting the Mechanism
Before considering the stochastic case governed by the transition probability, I
examine a deterministic case and show why the effectiveness of forward guidance differs
from standard models.
Suppose that the economy enters into the bad state in the current period and
the bad state continues for 10 periods. Thus, the economy goes back to the good state
at 10 periods ahead and stays at the good state thereafter.
Following McKay et al. (2016), consider an experiment in which the central
bank announces that it will cut the real interest rate for one period starting in 10 periods
so that the real interest rate will decrease by A?
This effect can be seen by iterating forward the dynamic IS curve and the New
10
Keynesian Phillips curve. In standard models, the effect is
∆xt = − 1
σ
∞∑
i=0
(rt+i − rnt+i) (1.7)
=
1
σ
A, (1.8)
∆pit = κ
∞∑
i=0
βi∆xt+i (1.9)
=
κ
σ
A
10∑
i=0
βi, (1.10)
where the variables ∆xt and ∆pit denotes the difference from the case without the policy
announcement. In the same way, we can calculate ∆xt+i,∆pit+i for any i. A numerical
result is in figure 1 with label “M1 = 1,M2 = 1”. As shown in McKay et al. (2016),
the effects of announcing the rate cut are stronger if the rate cut is further in the future
for inflation.
Moreover, when we compare the effects of these announcements on the current
periods and the period when the central bank actually lowers the interest rate, the
effects on the current periods are as large as on the later period for the output gap and
much larger for the inflation rate.
∆xt
∆xt+10
= 1, (1.11)
∆pit
∆pit+10
=
10∑
i=0
βi =
1− β11
1− β > 1. (1.12)
Also, what if the central bank announces a cut to the nominal interest rate for
11
Figure 1.1: An Interest Rate Cut in 10 quarters ahead
multiple periods starting in 10 periods ahead? The effect is
∆xt = − 1
σ
∞∑
i=0
(rt+i − rnt+i) (1.13)
=
n
σ
A, (1.14)
∆pit = κ
∞∑
i=0
βi∆xt+i (1.15)
=
κ
σ
A
n
10∑
i=0
βi +
n−1∑
j=1
β10βj(n− j)
 . (1.16)
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where n is the periods of forward guidance. Thus, when the central bank announces
a future interest rate cut for n periods, the effect becomes slightly more than n times
larger than the one-period rate cut.
In contrast, in the model with discounting, the effect of announcing a one-
period rate cut in 10 periods ahead is
∆xt = − 1
σ
∞∑
i=0
M i1(rt+i − rnt+i) (1.17)
=
1
σ
AM101 , (1.18)
∆pit = κ
∞∑
i=0
βi∆xt+i (1.19)
=
κ
σ
AM101
10∑
i=0
βiM i2. (1.20)
So the effects are muted by powers of M1 and M2. A numerical simulation is in figure
1 for two different combinations of M1 and M2 less than unity. We can see that the
effects on the current period are much weaker while the effects when the central bank
actually lowers the policy rate are the same.
The comparison of the effects on the current period and later periods becomes
∆xt
∆xt+10
= M101 , (1.21)
∆pit
∆pit+10
= M101
10∑
i=0
βiM i2 (1.22)
So now the feature that announcing rate cuts further in the future has stronger effects
disappears for small values of M1 and M2.
Also, the effect of announcing to cut the nominal interest rate for n periods
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starting in 10 periods ahead is
∆xt = − 1
σ
∞∑
i=0
M i1(rt+i − rnt+i) (1.23)
=
n
σ
AM101 , (1.24)
∆pit = κ
∞∑
i=0
βiM i2∆xt+i (1.25)
=
κ
σ
AM101
n
10∑
i=0
βiM i2 +
n−1∑
j=1
(βM2)
10βj(n− j)
 . (1.26)
So the fact that announcing an n-period rate cut in the future has effects that are
roughly n times larger than announcing a one-period rate cut is still true.
As a result, in the present model with discounting because of financial disrup-
tion, the effects of announcing a future rate cut on the current period could be very
weak, but the central bank can overcome this by announcing multiple-period rate cuts
in the future. However, this could incur a much larger cost because even in the present
model, the announcement has the same size of effects at later periods.
1.5 Equilibrium Outcomes
Now we discuss the stochastic case. To solve the model, we have to specify
the monetary policy rule. I assume that the central bank chooses optimal discretionary
policy unless the central bank commits to forward guidance.
The optimal discretionary policy is to set the real interest rate to achieve the
optimal discretionary targeting rule in the good state and set the nominal interest rate
at the effective lower bound in the bad state. The optimal discretionary targeting rule is
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derived by minimizing the current period quadratic loss functions, which will be formally
specified later, subject to the dynamic IS curve and the New Keynesian Phillips curve,
κpit + λxt = 0. (1.27)
For simplicity, the effective lower bound is set at zero.
Forward guidance is defined as the additional periods when the central bank
set the nominal interest rate at the effective lower bound beyond optimal discretionary
policy. This choice follows Walsh (2018) and greatly simplifies the computation of the
model. This forward guidance policy is more expansionary than the optimal discre-
tionary policy because it lowers the real interest rate in the future and higher expected
future output gap and inflation increases the current output gap and inflation.
For optimal discretionary policy and each length of forward guidance, we can
calculate economic outcomes and the loss functions at each point in time.
1.5.1 The Optimal Discretionary Policy
When the central bank does not use forward guidance, I assume that it follows
the optimal discretionary policy. For the optimal discretionary case, the central bank
sets the nominal interest rate equal to zero in the bad state, which is the effective lower
bound, and sets the nominal interest rate to achieve the targeting rule in the good state.
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Then, the economy is characterized by five equations
pidn = βEtpi
d
t+1 + κx
d
n (1.28)
xdn = Etx
d
t+1 −
1
σ
(idn − Etpidt+1 − ρ) (1.29)
pidz = βM2Etpi
d
t+1 + κx
d
z (1.30)
xdz = M1Etx
d
t+1 +
1
σ
(Etpi
d
t+1 + rz) (1.31)
0 = κpidn + λx
d
n, (1.32)
where the last equation is the targeting rule. Superscript “d” stands for optimal dis-
cretionary policy. Subscript “z” stands for the periods when the zero lower bound is
binding, and subscript “n” stands for the periods when the bound is not binding. Using
the transition matrix, we can write out conditional expectations and obtain
pidn = β(spi
d
n + (1− s)pidz ) + κxdn (1.33)
xdn = (sx
d
n + (1− s)xdz)−
1
σ
(idn − (spidn + (1− s)pidz )− ρ) (1.34)
pidz = βM2(qpi
d
z + (1− q)pidn) + κxdz (1.35)
xdz = M1(qx
d
z + (1− q)xdn) +
1
σ
((qpidz + (1− q)pidn) + rz) (1.36)
0 = κpidn + λx
d
n. (1.37)
This is a system of linear equations, and we can solve for these five economic variables.
When M1 = M2 = 1, this system is identical to standard New Keynesian models. What
is distinct about these equilibrium conditions is that discounting terms, M1,M2, show
up only in equations at the bad state.
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1.5.2 Forward Guidance Policy
First, we consider forward guidance policy for one period. The central bank set
the nominal interest rate at zero in the bad state, and it also sets the nominal interest
rate at zero in the first period when the economy moves from the bad state to the good
state. The central bank then sets the nominal interest rate to achieve the targeting rule
if the economy remains in the good state.
Then, the economy is characterized by the following seven equations
pifg1n = β(spi
fg1
n + (1− s)pifg1z ) + κxfg1n (1.38)
xfg1n = (sx
fg1
n + (1− s)xfg1z )−
1
σ
(ifg1n − (spifg1n + (1− s)pifg1z )− ρ) (1.39)
pifg1e = β(spi
fg1
n + (1− s)pifg1z ) + κxfg1e (1.40)
xfg1e = (sx
fg1
n + (1− s)xfg1z ) +
1
σ
((spifg1n + (1− s)pifg1z ) + ρ) (1.41)
pifg1z = βM2(qpi
fg1
z + (1− q)pifg1e ) + κxfg1z (1.42)
xfg1z = M1(qx
fg1
z + (1− q)xfg1e ) +
1
σ
((qpifg1z + (1− q)pifg1e ) + rz) (1.43)
0 = κpifg1n + λx
fg1
n , (1.44)
where superscript “fg1” stands for forward guidance with one period. Subscript “e”
stands for the period when the central bank sets the nominal interest rate at zero even
though the economy is at the good state because of forward guidance. This is a system
of linear equations, and we can solve for these seven economic variables. Extending this
analysis to forward guidance for k periods is straightforward. See the appendix for this.
To briefly illustrate how the discounting terms M1 and M2 affect equilibrium
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outcomes, Table 1 compares the model outcome with the standard case using the cali-
bration in section 7.
M1 ≈ 1, M2 ≈ 1 M1 = 0.7, M2 = 0.7
(pidz , x
d
z) (-0.01, -0.07) (-0.01, -0.07)
(pifg1z , x
fg1
z ) (-0.0011, -0.0585) (-0.0097, -0.0698)
The Output gaps are quarterly and the inflation rates are annually.
Table 1.1: The Output Gaps and the Inflation Rate at the ELB
1.6 Credibility of Forward Guidance
Given this economic system, we define credible forward guidance. We just saw
how forward guidance policy affects the economy with perfect credibility in (38)-(44).
However, forward guidance is a commitment policy. This fact is obvious from the fact
that this policy entails a deviation from the optimal discretionary policy by definition.
Thus, there is an issue of credibility in that even if the central bank has an incentive
to announce forward guidance at a point in time, it might want to renege on it in the
later period and revert to the optimal discretionary policy. Then, when agents know
this incentive structure of the central bank, they never form expectations believing the
forward guidance, so announcements of the forward guidance do not have any effects.
Since forward guidance does not have any actions until the future periods, it is crucial
to understand the incentive structure of the central bank.
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1.6.1 Loss Functions
I assume the central bank sticks to forward guidance only if it is desirable for
the central bank to do so in terms of the bank’s loss function. The central bank’s loss
function is the sum of discounted expected loss for each period
Lt =
∞∑
i=0
βiEt(pi
2
t+i + λx
2
t+i), (1.45)
or written recursively,
Lt = (pi
2
t + λx
2
t ) + βEtLt+1. (1.46)
For each monetary policy, we can calculate economic outcomes and the loss
functions at each state. Then, we can compare these loss functions and see whether the
central bank has the incentive to stick to forward guidance or not. We already saw how
to calculate economic outcomes. Here it is assumed that there is no chance of regaining
credibility once the central bank reneges on any promise. In section 7.3, I relax this
assumption.
Under the optimal discretionary policy, the present discount values of periodic
losses satisfy the following conditions
Ldn = (pi
d
n)
2 + λ(xdn)
2 + βEtL
d
t+1 (1.47)
Ldz = (pi
d
z )
2 + λ(xdz)
2 + βEtL
d
t+1. (1.48)
Again, by writing out the conditional expectations using the transition matrix, we obtain
Ldn = (pi
d
n)
2 + λ(xdn)
2 + β(sLdn + (1− s)Ldz) (1.49)
Ldz = (pi
d
z )
2 + λ(xdz)
2 + β(qLdz + (1− q)Ldn). (1.50)
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Given the four economic variables, pidn, x
d
n, pi
d
z , x
d
z , this is another system of linear equa-
tions, and we can solve for the two loss functions.
Next, losses with one-period forward guidance satisfy the following conditions
Lfg1n = (pi
fg1
n )
2 + λ(xfg1n )
2 + β(sLfg1n + (1− s)Lfg1z ) (1.51)
Lfg1e = (pi
fg1
e )
2 + λ(xfg1e )
2 + β(sLfg1n + (1− s)Lfg1z ) (1.52)
Lfg1z = (pi
fg1
z )
2 + λ(xfg1z )
2 + β(qLfg1z + (1− q)Lfg1e ). (1.53)
Given the output gaps and the inflation rate that satisfy (38)-(44), (51)-(53) are to solve
for the present discount value of losses in each state.
Extending this analysis to forward guidance for k periods is straightforward.
See the appendix for this.
For ease of interpretation, the loss functions are transformed so that unit is
steady-state consumption equivalence following Billi (2011),
µ = (1− β)
(
ωθ(1 + ηθ)
(1− ω)(1− ωβ)
)
L.
When µ = 0.01, this means that 0.01% of steady-state consumption is lost.
1.6.1.1 Definition of Optimal Forward Guidance
Given these losses at each state associated with each length of forward guid-
ance, I define optimal forward guidance as the forward guidance which minimizes losses
when the zero lower bound is binding. This is what the central bank wants to carry out
if it has perfect credibility.
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1.6.2 Credibility
However, in this model, credibility is endogenous. The definition of credible
forward guidance depends on the assumption of the alternative policy which the central
bank reverts to when it reneges on the forward guidance. I assume the alternative policy
is forward guidance with shorter periods.
Here is the mechanism to check the credibility. Loss functions with the forward
guidance of interest are compared with loss functions with alternative policies at all
points in time, and if it is lower at all points in time, the forward guidance of interest
is credible. Otherwise, the central bank has the incentive to deviate from the forward
guidance at some point in time and agents do not trust this forward guidance from the
very beginning.
1.6.2.1 Reverts-to-Forward Guidance with Shorter Periods
The definition of credible forward guidance comes from the idea that even if
the central bank reneges on the promise, it does not necessarily lose all of the credibility
because the loss functions are smaller in this case.
We check the credibility of forward guidance recursively. First, forward guid-
ance with one period is credible if and only if
Lfg1z < L
d
z , (1.54)
Lfg1e < L
d
n, (1.55)
Lfg1n < L
d
n. (1.56)
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Then, given that forward guidance with one period is credible, the alternative policy
becomes forward guidance with one period. Thus, to check the credibility of forward
guidance with two periods, we compare loss functions with forward guidance for two
periods and those with forward guidance for one period. Forward guidance with two
periods is credible if and only if forward guidance for one period is credible and
Lfg2z < L
fg1
z , (1.57)
Lfg2e < L
fg1
e , (1.58)
Lfg2e2 < L
fg1
n , (1.59)
Lfg2n < L
fg1
n . (1.60)
In all cases considered, what is relevant is the first exit period. This result is
because loss functions at the bad state are usually lower with forward guidance unless
the length is not too long, and then loss functions at the normal state tend to be lower
because the loss in the crises is lower. Finally, if the central bank wants to deviate from
forward guidance at one of the exit periods, it often deviates from the very beginning
of the exit periods because the cost of staying with forward guidance starts to accrue
at the first exit period
As a result, we only have to the check sign of gain and temptation. Gain is
the difference between the two loss functions in (54) and (57). This measures whether
at the bad state, the central bank has the incentive to extend the horizon of forward
guidance for one more period or not. If the gain is negative, the forward guidance with
one more period is not credible.
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The temptation is the difference of the two loss functions in (55) and (58). This
measure whether at the first exit period the central bank has the incentive to renege
on the promise or not. If the sign of temptation is positive, the forward guidance in
consideration is not credible.
In Nakata (2018) and Walsh (2018), the alternative policy is the optimal dis-
cretionary policy. When this alternative policy is used, sustainability is gained as long
as losses with forward guidance for k periods at each state are smaller than losses with
the optimal discretionary policy. As a result, it is possible that losses with forward
guidance for specific periods are higher at one state than losses with forward guidance
for shorter periods. On the contrary, when the alternative policy is forward guidance
with shorter periods, forward guidance is sustainable if losses at each state are smaller
than forward guidance for any shorter periods.
As a result, in some cases, optimal forward guidance can be achieved as the
optimal sustainable forward guidance. In other cases, optimal forward guidance is not
sustainable, and the best the central bank can do is to follow the optimal sustainable
forward guidance, which minimizes the losses at the bad state among sustainable forward
guidance.
1.7 Simulations and Results
Now we simulate an economy with occasional financial crises. The size of
the negative shock is calibrated so that the inflation rate becomes -1% annually and
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the output gap becomes -7% quarterly in the bad state with the optimal discretionary
policy as in Nakata (2018). To achieve the target, a cost-push shock is added in this
part on top of the negative shock to the natural rate of interest when the economy is at
the bad state.3
1.7.1 Parameterization
Baseline parameters are summarized in Table 1. Most of these parameters are
standard except parameters to govern the transition probability of the states, s and
q, and discounting parameters on expected terms in dynamic IS curve, M1, and New
Keynesian Phillips curve, M2. Results with several different values will be shown to see
some specific parameter values do not drive important results.
The transition probability is chosen so that the expected duration of the good
state is 50 years and the expected duration of the bad state is 2.5 years. This corresponds
to s = 0.995 and q = 0.9 and implies that 4.8% of the time, the economy experiences
financial disruptions. This value is lower than Walsh (2018), which reports that the
U.S. economy was at the effective lower bound for 12% of the time. The difference can
be somewhat justified because not all of the zero lower bound periods are associated
with financial disruption, and financial disruption is at the center of the present model.
The discounting parameters are harder to calibrate. Fuhrer and Rudebusch
(2004) estimated the Euler equation and found the value of M1 close to 0.6. Mavroeidis
3When M1 and M2 change, how strongly demand shocks affect the output gap relative to the inflation
rate changes, and we cannot achieve the calibration target. The size of cost-push shocks changes for
different values of M1 and M2.
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et al. (2014) estimated the New Keynesian Phillips curve and found the value of M2
around 0.5 to 0.7. Therefore, I choose default values of the discounting as M1 = M2 =
0.7.
Parameters Description Values
β Discount factor 0.99
σ Relative risk aversion 2
ω Probability of no resetting price opportunity 0.75
κ Slope of the Phillips curve 0.02
θ Elasticity of demand 7.66
λ Relative weight on output gap volatility 0.003
s Probability of staying at the good state 0.995
q Probability of staying at the bad state 0.9
M Discounting in Dynamic IS curve 0.7
N Discounting in New Keynesian Phillips curve 0.7
Table 1.2: Parameter Values
1.7.2 Results
As a comparison, I first show the result when M1 = 0.99, M2 = 0.99, which
is essentially a standard New Keynesian model.4 Figure 2 shows how the output gap
and inflation rate behaves in the case where the bad state continues from period 1 to
6. Under the optimal discretionary policy, which corresponds to k = 0, the economy
suffers from a negative output gap and especially large deflation. However, when the
central bank commits to forward guidance with one period, k = 1, even at the bad state,
inflation becomes very close to zero, which is the optimal level. At period 7, which is the
first exit period, output gap and inflation rate are both positive, and this is not desirable
4The only reason M1 and M2 are not unity is because if so, forward guidance for one period is
too strong and the output gap and the inflation rate at the ZLB becomes higher than those at the
non-binding state.
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M1 ≈ 1, M2 ≈ 1
Lz Gain Temptation
k=0 0.2013 — —
k=1 0.0990 0.1022 -0.0342
k=2 0.1077 -0.0087 0.0035
k=3 0.2891 -0.1814 0.0623
Loss is measured in steady-state consumption level.
Table 1.3: Welfare Gain and Incentive to Deviate in Standard Case
in terms of optimal discretionary view. However, by accepting this undesirable boom
at the exit period, the economy at the bad state performs much better. We can see
this from table 3. Under the optimal discretionary policy, the value of loss function is
0.20 at the bad state. By committing to forward guidance with one period, the loss
reduces to 0.10. The loss function associated with forward guidance with two periods
is higher, and gain becomes negative, so forward guidance with one period is optimal
forward guidance.
Next, we check whether the optimal forward guidance is sustainable or not.
For k = 1, the temptation is negative. This means that the central bank does not have
the incentive to renege on the promise. Therefore, in this benchmark case, the central
bank only needs to commit to forward guidance with one period, and the policy is very
powerful and credible.
Now, we see the result when M1 = 0.7, M2 = 0.7. Figure 3 shows how
the output gap and the inflation rate behave. Under the optimal discretionary policy,
the behavior is basically the same as the standard case. However, the behavior under
optimal forward guidance, which is for 7 periods, k = 7, is very different. First, the
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Figure 1.2: A Realized Time Series with a Standard Case (M1 ≈ 1, M2 ≈ 1)
central bank commits to forward guidance with longer horizons. This is because as
we saw in section 4, when M1 and M2 are smaller, the effects of a future interest cut
become smaller. Second, even with this longer forward guidance, the economy suffers
from a large negative output gap and severe deflation. Third, at exit periods, the
economy deviates significantly from the optimal level, which is zero. Table 4 shows
loss functions. Gain is positive until forward guidance with 7 periods, k = 7, so this is
the optimal forward guidance. The loss function at the bad state reduces significantly
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from 0.204 to 0.160, but the welfare gain is much smaller compared to the benchmark
case, which is from 0.20 to 0.10. So compared to the standard case, the welfare gain of
optimal is only 48%.
Next, the optimal forward guidance is not sustainable anymore. In table 3,
the value of temptation under forward guidance for 7 periods, k = 7, is negative. This
means that if the central bank announces to keep the interest rate at zero for 7 periods
once the economy goes back to the normal state, the central bank has the incentive
to renege on the promise at the first exit period. Agents in the economy know this
incentive structure of the central bank and the forward guidance with 7 periods is not
sustainable. Forward guidance with 5 periods or above also has negative temptation,
and this is not credible. As a result, optimal sustainable forward guidance is with 4
periods, k = 4. The reason why forward guidance with long periods is not sustainable
in this case is that the economy has to suffer from large deviation from the optimal level
at exit periods.
Under the optimal sustainable forward guidance, the loss function at the bad
state reduces only to 0.173. As a result, compared to the standard case, the effectiveness
of optimal sustainable forward guidance by 33%.
This result is driven by M1 and M2 being both lower than unity. For example
when M1 = 1 and M2 = 0.7, optimal forward guidance, which is with 6 periods, k = 6,
reduces loss functions from 0.20 to 0.04. Optimal sustainable forward guidance, which
is with 5 periods, k = 5, still reduces loss functions to 0.05, so forward guidance is
very effective. And the result is similar when M1 = 0.7 and M2 = 1, optimal forward
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Figure 1.3: A Realized Time Series with a Discounted Case (M1 = 0.7,M2 = 0.7)
guidance, which is with 5 periods, k = 5, reduces loss functions from 0.203 to 0.117,
which is 89% of the standard case, and optimal sustainable forward guidance, which
is with 4 periods, k = 4, still reduces loss functions to 0.123, which is 83% compared
to the standard case. This result is driven by the fact that there is complementarity
between M1 and M2 about the effects of forward guidance on the current economy as
we can see in equation (20).
Also, the result is driven by the fact that the discounting terms M1 and M2
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M1 = 0.7, M2 = 0.7
Lz Gain Temptation
k=0 0.2037 — —
k=1 0.1966 0.0071 -0.00231
k=2 0.1889 0.0077 -0.00235
k=3 0.1808 0.0081 -0.00207
k=4 0.1729 0.0079 -0.00129
k=5 0.1660 0.0070 0.00025
k=6 0.1610 0.0050 0.00287
k=7 0.1595 0.0015 0.00703
k=8 0.1635 -0.0040 0.01325
k=9 0.1757 -0.0122 0.02224
Loss is measured in steady-state consumption level.
Table 1.4: Welfare Gain and Incentive to Deviate in a Discounted Case
show up only in the bad state. For example, when I generalize the model in that the
discounting terms in the good state are M1,g and M2,g and the discounting terms in
the bad state are M1,b and M2,b. The figure 4 shows the case when M1,g = M1,b = 0.7
and M2,g = M2,b = 0.7. The optimal forward guidance is for k = 8 and the optimal
sustainable forward guidance is for k = 4.
Qualitatively, figure 3 and figure 4 are similar. However, we can see several
differences. First, the negative output gap and the negative inflation rate at the bad
state become severe in this case. This is because now the discounting occurs also at the
good state, and the feature that doubling the length of forward guidance has roughly
doubling effects on the current economy, which is shown in section 4, does not hold
anymore. As a result, even though the central bank commits to more extended forward
guidance, the effects at the bad state are smaller. Second, the size of deviation at exit
periods is also smaller. This is again because now the discounting occurs even at the
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good state.
Figure 1.4: A Realized Time Series with an Always Discounted Case (M1,g = M1,b = 0.7,
M2,g = M2,b = 0.7)
We can see the implications of these changes for the losses and the credibility
in table 5. First, the effectiveness of forward guidance under perfect credibility is much
smaller. In the state-dependent discounting case, optimal forward guidance reduces the
losses from 0.20 to 0.16, but in the always discounting case, optimal forward guidance
reduces the losses from 0.20 only to 0.18. Since the discounting is stronger, we can see
that the gain from additional length of forward guidance decreases much faster in the
31
M1,b = M1,g = 0.7, M2,b = M2,g = 0.7
Lz Gain Temptation
k=0 0.2031 — —
k=1 0.1959 0.0072 -0.00233
k=2 0.1904 0.0055 -0.00165
k=3 0.1863 0.0041 -0.00102
k=4 0.1834 0.0029 -0.00046
k=5 0.1815 0.0019 0.00002
k=6 0.1804 0.0011 0.00043
k=7 0.1799 0.0005 0.00076
k=8 0.1799 -0.0000 0.00103
k=9 0.1803 -0.0004 0.00125
Loss is measured in steady-state consumption level.
Table 1.5: Welfare in an Always Discounted Case
Gain column of table 5. The effectiveness of optimal forward guidance is 25% compared
to the standard case.
Second, how much lack of credibility reduces the effectiveness of forward guid-
ance becomes smaller. In the state-dependent discounting case, the difference between
the effectiveness of optimal forward guidance and optimal sustainable forward guidance
is 15% (=48%-33%) of the standard case. In the always discounting case, optimal sus-
tainable forward guidance has 21% of welfare gain compared to the standard case. So
the difference between the effectiveness of optimal forward guidance and optimal sus-
tainable forward guidance is only 4% (=25%-21%). Credibility matters much more in
the state-dependent discounting case.
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1.7.3 Assumptions on Punishment
So far, we assumed that once the central bank reneges on the promise, there is
no chance of regaining credibility. This might be a strong assumption, so the assumption
is relaxed by introducing a fixed exogenous probability of regaining credibility.
Once the central bank reneges on forward guidance, credibility will be lost but
there is a small probability, φ, in each period that the central bank will regain credibility.
One advantage of this way of modeling is that when φ = 0, the assumption goes back
to everlasting punishment.
There are several details on this assumption. The first one is that when the
economy is at “bad” state or “exit” periods, there is no possibility of regaining credibil-
ity. The second one is that there is no possibility of regaining credibility on the period
when the central bank breaks the promise. These two assumptions are just operational,
and we can easily modify these.
Since now agents know that there is a positive probability that the central bank
regains credibility, the economic variables behave differently from previous cases. At
“normal” state, the economy can stay at the same state or go to “bad” state as before.
On top of this, if the central bank has not regained credibility yet, there is probability
φ that the central bank regains credibility conditioning on the fact that the state in the
next period is good. Since the economy at exit periods and crisis periods depends on
the situation in the good state, all of the economic variables change with the possibility
of regaining credibility. As a result, loss functions also change, and the implications for
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credibility is different. The details of all the equations are in the appendix.
Now we go back to the table 4, which is for M1 = 0.7, M2 = 0.7. Only changes
are at the temptation column and the length of optimal sustainable forward guidance.
When φ = 0.0125, which is 5% probability of regaining credibility a year, the optimal
sustainable forward guidance is with 3 periods, k = 3, and it reduces loss functions
from 0.204 only to 0.181. Compared to the standard case, the effectiveness of optimal
sustainable forward guidance is 25%. Thus, lack of credibility reduces 23% (=48%-25%)
of the welfare gain in the standard case. When φ = 0.04, the effectiveness is 16%, and
32% (=48%-16%)of welfare in the standard case is lost due to lack of credibility.
1.8 Conclusions
The paper analyzed how the introduction of financial disruption changes im-
plications of forward guidance. In crises periods, both households and firms respond
less to future monetary shocks because of precautionary saving and the value of current
profit increases more than in normal times. As a result, three results emerge. First,
forward guidance affects the current economy much less strongly without changing its
effect when the economy exits the lower bound. Second, the effectiveness of forward
guidance becomes weaker even if the central bank has perfect credibility and commit to
forward guidance with a longer horizon. Third, since output gaps and inflation experi-
ence larger deviation from the optimal level at exit periods, credibility concerns make
the effectiveness of optimal sustainable forward guidance even weaker. The results sug-
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gest that even if the economy responds to future shocks in normal times, if the economy
responds less to future shocks in crisis periods, the effectiveness of forward guidance
becomes weaker.
Future research is required to analyze the connection between financial disrup-
tion and forward-looking degree of the economy more generally. Then, we can analyze
the complementarity between forward guidance and other instruments to help financial
intermediaries. Also, investigating other implications from state-dependent forward-
looking degree is of interest.
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Chapter 2
Credible Forward Guidance in a Low
Natural Rate Environment
2.1 Introduction
When the current interest rate is already at the effective lower bound, for-
ward guidance, which is announcements on future interest rates, becomes an important
monetary policy rule for central banks. Actually, many central banks around the world
conducted some forms of forward guidance after the global financial crisis originated
from the Great Recession.
However, many central banks could not achieve their inflation target despite
their very aggressive forward guidance. For example, in Japan, the Bank of Japan has
not achieved it’s inflation target for the last 20 years.
This is hard to be consistent with standard New Keynesian models because
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forward guidance is very powerful in these models. Also, since the failure of achieving
the inflation target lasted a long time, sharp changes due to financial crises cannot be
the sole reason for the inability of forward guidance.
One of the significant long-term changes occurred in interest rates. As Eggets-
son et al. (2019) pointed out, in the last 25 years, interest rates has been steadily
declining in many developed countries. This might have a huge implication on mon-
etary policy through the current interest rate. Whether the current interest rate is
expansionary or contractionary depends on the underlying neutral rate. If the under-
lying neutral rate has decreased and continues to stay low, the room for expansionary
monetary policy might become smaller because interests cannot go below the effective
lower bound.
However, implications on forward guidance is less clear. For each period of
forward guidance, the room for expansionary policy becomes smaller in the same logic,
however, central banks can extend the horizons of forward guidance. By doing so,
central bank do not necessarily lose their ability to control business cycles.
Therefore, in this paper, I analyze the effectiveness of forward guidance in a
low natural rate environment. The economy switches between the good state and the
bad state, which differs in the natural rate of interest. At the bad state, the natural
rate of interest is so low that the central bank has incentive to rely on forward guidance
on top of setting the current interest rate at the effective lower bound.
The most important result is that, when the natural rate of interest rate is
lower even after recovering from recessions, the central bank has to implement longer
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forward guidance to achieve the same size of effects on the current period. However, it
is shown that this prolonged forward guidance is more costly for the society because the
economy has to deviate more from the optimal level. This cost becomes larger when
the economy respond less to future shocks.
Then, this leads to the fact that optimal forward guidance becomes less ef-
fective even when the central bank has perfect credibility. On top of that, it becomes
harder to maintain credibility because the cost of keeping the promise becomes larger.
As a result, the effectiveness of forward guidance becomes even weaker.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, the relevant literature are re-
viewed. Section 3 starts the model and section 4 explains the main driver of the results.
Section 5 delivers equilibrium outcomes and defines optimal forward guidance and opti-
mal sustainable forward guidance. Section 6 shows the results and section 7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
There are some papers which analyze the effectiveness of forward guidance with
endogenous credibility. Walsh (2018) and Nakata (2018) use standard New Keynesian
models and found that credibility is not an issue because forward guidance in standard
New Keynesian models affects the current economy more than later periods.1
There are several papers which analyze the effectiveness of forward guid-
ance with endogenous credibility using modified New Keynesian models. Nakata and
1Nakata et al. (forthcoming) analyze how the optimal forward guidance differs using a New Keyensian
model with the discounted Euler equation and the discounted Phillips curve under perfect credibility.
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Sunakawa (2019) analyze the optimal credible forward guidance using the discounted
New Keynesian Phillips curve. Sukeda (2019) showed that when the economy respond
less to future shocks in recessions, the effectiveness of forward guidance becomes smaller
and credibility limits the effectiveness of forward guidance. Neither of the papers analyze
how the optimal forward guidance depends on a low natural rate of interest environment.
Summers (2014) pointed out the possibility of secular stagnation in the U.S.,
which is represented by persistently low natural rate of interest. Eggertsson et al.
(2019) showed that interest rates have been steadily declining in the last 30 years in
several developed countries. How this affects the effectiveness of forward guidance is
not answered yet.
2.3 The Model
The basic structure of the model follows Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) in
that there are two aggregate states of the world.2
The economy is characterized by the standard dynamic IS curve and the New
Keynesian Phillips curve,
xt = M1Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1 − rnt ) (2.1)
pit = βM2Etpit+1 + κxt, (2.2)
where xt is the output gap, it is the nominal interest rate, pit is the inflation rate,
and rnt is the natural rate of interest. M1 and M2 are parameters which determine
2This structure is often used to analyze equilibrium at the effective lower bound on nominal interest
rates. See, for example, Nakata (2018) and Walsh (2018).
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how the current output gap and the inflation rate responds to future variables. Since
standard New Keynesian models, which have M1 = 1 and M2 = 1, are known to have
unrealistically large response from forward guidance, I introduce these parameters.
The natural rate of interest depends on the aggregate state as in Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003). The natural rate of interest rate is positive when the economy is
in the good state and becomes negative when the economy is in the bad state,
rnt =

rn > 0 if the state is good
rz < 0 if the state is bad.
(2.3)
Note that unlike Sukeda (2019), M1 and M2 are not state dependent, and only the
natural rate of interest is state dependent.
The economy switches between the two systems following the Markov process
as in Nakata (2018) and Walsh (2018),
P ≡
 pgg pgb
pbg pbb
 =
 s 1− s
1− q q
 , (2.4)
where pij with i ∈ {g, b}, j ∈ {g, b} is the probability of switching from the state i to
state j, and g stands for the good state and b stands for the bad state.
To close the model, we need to specify monetary policy, which will be discussed
in section 5.
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2.4 Inspecting the Mechanism
Before considering the stochastic case governed by the transition probability, I
examine a deterministic case and show why the effectiveness of forward guidance differs
from standard models.
Suppose that the economy enters into the bad state in the current period and
the bad state continues for 10 periods. Thus, the economy goes back to the good state
at 10 periods ahead and stays at the good state thereafter.
Following McKay et al. (2016), consider an experiment in which the central
bank announces that it will cut the real interest rate for one period starting in 10 periods
so that the real interest rate will decrease by A?
This effect can be seen by iterating forward the dynamic IS curve and the New
Keynesian Phillips curve. The effect is
∆xt = − 1
σ
∞∑
i=0
M i1(rt+i − rnt+i) (2.5)
=
1
σ
AM101 , (2.6)
∆pit = κ
∞∑
i=0
βiM i2∆xt+i (2.7)
=
κ
σ
AM101
10∑
i=0
βi
(
M2
M1
)i
, (2.8)
where the variables ∆xt and ∆pit denotes the difference from the case without the policy
announcement. In the same way, we can calculate ∆xt+i,∆pit+i for any i. As shown in
McKay et al. (2016), when the values of M1 and M2 are unity, the effects of announcing
the rate cut are stronger if the rate cut is further in the future for inflation, and here
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we can see that the claim holds as long as the values are close enough to unity.
Moreover, when we compare the effects of these announcements on the current
periods and the period when the central bank actually lowers the interest rate, the
effects on the current periods are as large as on the later period for the output gap and
much larger for the inflation rate as long as values of M1 and M2 are close to unity.
∆xt
∆xt+10
= M101 , (2.9)
∆pit
∆pit+10
= M101
10∑
i=0
βi
(
M2
M1
)i
. (2.10)
Both of these points can be seen from a simulation result in Figure 1. The result is
identical to Sukeda (2019) even though this model is different in that M1 and M2 are
not state dependent.
Now, consider a policy announcement that the central bank will cut the real
interest rate by half of A, but on the other hand, the rate will be lower for two periods.
The effect of this announcement on the current period is
∆xt = − 1
σ
∞∑
i=0
M i1(rt+i − rnt+i) (2.11)
=
1
σ
(
A
2
+
A
2
M1
)
M101 =
1
σ
AM101
(
1 +M1
2
)
, (2.12)
∆pit = κ
∞∑
i=0
βiM i2∆xt+i (2.13)
=
κ
σ
A
(
M101
10∑
i=0
βi
(
M2
M1
)i
+
1
2
β11M112
)
. (2.14)
Thus the effect of the two policy experiments on the current periods are very similar (0%
change for the output gap and 4.2% change for the inflation, given β = 0.99, M1 = 1,
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Figure 2.1: An Interest Rate Cut in 10 quarters ahead
M2 = 1). However, the cumulative effects after the rate cut are
∆xct+10 = ∆xt+10 + ∆xt+11 (2.15)
=
1
σ
A
(
1 +M1
2
)
+
1
σ
(
A
2
)
=
(
1 +
M1
2
)(
1
σ
A
)
, (2.16)
∆pict+10 = ∆pit+10 + ∆pit+11 (2.17)
=
κ
σ
A
(
1 +M1 + βM2
2
)
+
κ
σ
A
(
1
2
)
(2.18)
=
κ
σ
A
(
1 +
M1 + βM2
2
)
. (2.19)
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Thus, the effect of the two policy experiments on the cumulative effects after the rate
cut is very different (50% increase for the output gap and 100% increase for inflation
given β = 0.99, M1 = 1, M2 = 1). For the three-period case, the numbers become 100%
for output gap and 232% for inflation given the same parameters, and 150% and 396%
for the four-period case. The details of the numbers are shown in the appendix.
A simulation result is shown in Figure 2. The simulation compares the effect
of an interest rate cut for one period starting in 10 quarters ahead and the effect of an
interest cut for three periods starting also in 10 quarters ahead with similar effects on
the initial period. The value of M1 and M2 are set to be M1 = 0.8, M2 = 0.8. First,
as shown theoretically in the case for M1 = 1 and M2 = 1, we can see that an interest
rate cut for multiple periods affect more at and after the 10 quarters ahead.
Moreover, when M1 and M2 are less than unity, doubling the length of interest
cuts is not enough to double the effect on the current period. When the central bank
tries to achieve the same effect on the current period, it has to rely on more aggressive
forward guidance than just doubling the length of the rate cuts. The simulation result
shows that the cumulative effects after the rate cut is 110% for output gap and 324%
for inflation rate. As a result, there is interaction between how much the economy is
forward looking and how costly the lower natural rate of interest rate is.
Therefore, in a low natural rate environment where the central bank might
have to commit to forward guidance with longer horizons, the economy might have to
incur much larger cost from forward guidance at the exit periods.
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Figure 2.2: Comparison between an Rate Cut for One period and Three periods
2.5 Equilibrium Outcomes and Credibility of Forward Guid-
ance
Now we discuss the stochastic case. Since the assumptions of monetary policy
and the definition of credibility are the same as Sukeda (2019), this section follows the
paper closely. To solve the model, we have to specify the monetary policy rule. As
in Walsh (2018), I assume that the central bank chooses optimal discretionary policy
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unless the central bank commits to forward guidance. So the monetary policy rule for
the optimal discretionary case is conducted to satisfy
κpit + λxt = 0. (2.20)
For simplicity, the effective lower bound is set at zero.
Forward guidance is defined as the additional periods when the central bank
set the nominal interest rate at the nominal interest rate at the effective lower bound
beyond optimal discretionary policy. This choice follows Walsh (2018) and greatly
simplifies the computation of the model.
For optimal discretionary policy and each length of forward guidance, we can
calculate economic outcomes and the loss functions at each point in time. The only
difference is that the discounting parameters are not state dependent. See appendix for
the details.
The central bank’s loss function is the sum of discounted expected loss for each
period
Lt =
∞∑
i=0
βiEt(pi
2
t+i + λx
2
t+i), (2.21)
or written recursively,
Lt = (pi
2
t + λx
2
t ) + βEtLt+1. (2.22)
For each monetary policy, we can calculate economic outcomes and the loss
function at each state. Then, we can compare these loss functions and see whether the
central bank has the incentive to stick to forward guidance or not. Here it is assumed
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that there is no chance of regaining credibility once the central bank reneges on any
promises. We relax this assumption in a later part.
For ease of interpretation, the loss functions are transformed so that unit is
steady-state consumption equivalence following Billi (2011),
µ = (1− β)
(
ωθ(1 + ηθ)
(1− ω)(1− ωβ)
)
L. (2.23)
When µ = 0.01, it means that 0.01% of steady-state consumption is lost.
2.6 Simulations and Results
Now we simulate an economy with stochastic shocks. As in Nakata (2018),
parameters are calibrate to match −7% for output gap and −1% for the annualized
inflation rate when the economy is at the bad state. Parameters about the frequency of
the good and the bad state follow Sukeda (2019).
The key parameter in this paper is the natural rate of interest at the good
state. Without any wedges, the natural rate of interest is determined by
β(1 + rn) = 1. (2.24)
Since the discount factor affect the value of future gain and cost, I introduce a wedge
such that the natural rate of interest can change without changing the value of the
discount factor. The wedge, α, is given as
β
(
1 +
rn
α
)
= 1 (2.25)
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When α is larger, the natural rate of interest becomes larger. To see how does low
natural rate of interest environments affect the effectiveness, I compare the case in
which α = 1 as the benchmark and α = 1/3 as a case in which the natural rate of
interest is low. The calibrated parameters are summarized in Table 1.
Parameters Description Values
β Discount factor 0.99
σ Relative risk aversion 2
ω Probability of no resetting price opportunity 0.75
κ Slope of the Phillips curve 0.02
θ Elasticity of demand 7.66
λ Relative weight on output gap volatility 0.003
s Probability of staying at the good state 0.995
q Probability of staying at the bad state 0.9
M1 Discounting in Dynamic IS curve 0.9
M2 Discounting in New Keynesian Phillips curve 0.9
α Adjustment of the Natural Rate of Interest 1/3
Table 2.1: Parameter Values
First, I show the result for the benchmark case. Table 2 summarizes the loss for
different duration of forward guidance. The optimal forward guidance, which minimizes
the loss under perfect credibility is for k = 7. This reduces the loss from 0.20 to 0.09
compared to the optimal discretionary case, k = 0. However, forward guidance with
seven periods, k = 7, is not sustainable. This is because temptation is positive at k = 7.
Since forward guidance with six periods, k = 6, also has marginally positive temptation,
the optimal sustainable forward guidance is for five periods. With this policy, the loss
is reduced only to 0.10. Compared to the perfect credibility case, the effectiveness is
91%. Thus, credibility lowers the effectiveness of forward guidance, but the quantitative
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M1 = 0.9, M2 = 0.9, α = 1/3
Lz Gain Temptation
k=0 0.2036 — —
k=1 0.1764 0.0272 -0.0090
k=2 0.1519 0.0245 -0.0079
k=3 0.1308 0.0212 -0.0065
k=4 0.1135 0.0173 -0.0047
k=5 0.1006 0.0129 -0.0025
k=6 0.0927 0.0079 0.0000
k=7 0.0902 0.0025 0.0031
k=8 0.0936 -0.0034 0.0066
Loss is measured in steady-state consumption level.
Table 2.2: Welfare Gain and Incentive to Deviate in a Benchmark Case
impact is not large in this case.
Figure 3 shows how the output gap and the inflation rate behaves. The du-
ration of the bad state was assumed to be ten periods ex post. Forward guidance
significantly brings the output gap and the inflation rate at the bad state close to zero.
However, it also brings the output gap and the inflation rate once the economy goes
back to the good state away from zero. This deviation is larger for the forward guidance
with longer periods, and this is the reason why forward guidance with seven periods,
k = 7, is not credible.
Now we see how a low natural rate of interest environment affect the effec-
tiveness of forward guidance. Table 3 summarizes the results. The optimal forward
guidance under perfect credibility is for seventeen periods, k = 17, which is much longer
than the benchmark case. Also, the loss reduces from 0.20 only to 0.12. Compared
to the perfect credibility case in the benchmark, the effectiveness is 74%. So the effec-
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Figure 2.3: Output Gap and Inflation Rate in the Benchmark Case
tiveness of forward guidance under perfect credibility decreases in a low natural rate
environment. Moreover, the optimal sustainable forward guidance is with twelve peri-
ods, k = 12, and the loss associated with it is 0.13. The effectiveness of forward guidance
is 66% compared to the perfect credibility case in the benchmark case.
Figure 4 shows how the output gap and the inflation rate behaves. Compared
to the benchmark case, the output gap and the inflation rate at the bad state is more
away from zero.
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M1 = 0.9, M2 = 0.9, α = 1/3
Lz Gain Temptation
k=0 0.2036 — —
k=1 0.1957 0.0079 -0.0026
k=2 0.1879 0.0078 -0.0026
k=3 0.1803 0.0076 -0.0025
k=4 0.1729 0.0074 -0.0024
k=5 0.1658 0.0071 -0.0022
k=6 0.1591 0.0067 -0.0020
k=7 0.1528 0.0064 -0.0018
k=8 0.1468 0.0059 -0.0016
k=9 0.1414 0.0054 -0.0013
k=10 0.1365 0.0049 -0.0009
k=11 0.1321 0.0044 -0.0005
k=12 0.1284 0.0038 -0.0001
k=13 0.1253 0.0031 0.0003
k=14 0.1228 0.0024 0.0008
k=15 0.1211 0.0017 0.0014
k=16 0.1201 0.0010 0.0020
k=17 0.1200 0.0002 0.0026
k=18 0.1206 -0.0006 0.0032
Loss is measured in steady-state consumption level.
Table 2.3: Welfare Gain and Incentive to Deviate in a Low Natural Rate Case
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Figure 2.4: Output Gap and Inflation Rate in a Low Natural Rate Case
2.7 Conclusions
The paper analyzes how the low natural rate of interest environment affects
the effectiveness of forward guidance. Forward guidance relies on the relatively high
natural rate of interest rate when the economy gets out of recession. However, when
this natural rate of interest rate becomes lower, the central bank has to implement
longer forward guidance to achieve the same size of the effects on the current period,
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and this is more costly because the economy has to deviate from the optimal level more
and longer once recessions are over. As a result, the effectiveness of forward guidance
becomes smaller even with perfect credibility. Moreover, it becomes harder to maintain
credibility and this limits the effectiveness of forward guidance even more.
In the model, the low natural rate was exogenously assumed. To analyze
the complementarity between monetary policy and other instruments to tackle the low
natural rate of interest, we have model factors which determine the level of the natural
interest rate.
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Chapter 3
The Effects of Monetary Policy with
Financial Disruption
3.1 Introduction
Monetary policy is given a dominant role to counteract excessive business cycles
and there is a large consensus that monetary policy can affect business cycles in normal
times. However, recent events such as hitting the effective lower bound of the policy
interest rate and underachieving inflation targets cast doubts about our understanding
of the effects of monetary policy under financial crises.
The role of financial distress is not captured well in standard New Keynesian
models. What is assumed in those models is the perfect financial market. Financial
intermediaries do not charge any markup over funding cost. As a result, we do not
need to explicitly model the financial sector with the perfect financial market. Also,
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since there is no heterogeneity among households in the models, there is zero amount
of borrowing in equilibrium among households.
However, one of the characteristics of financial crises is very sharp rises in
credit spreads. When the financial sector charges high spreads over funding rate, in
response to an increase in credit demand, the equilibrium amount of credit becomes
smaller relative to the case with the perfect financial market. As a result, monetary
policy might affect the economy less in financial crises.
To generate a nontrivial finance needs in the model, I introduce two types of
households, who differ in the marginal cost of working. Each household stochastically
switches between the two types over time, and they are homogeneous ex ante. However,
once the type for the current period is realized, each household is classified by the
marginal cost of working. As a result, when a household has higher marginal cost of
working in the current period, they want to borrow from those with lower marginal cost
because their permanent income is almost identical.
Then, the financial market plays a key role in the model, and the degree of
financial intermediation is captured by the marginal cost of extending loans. When the
marginal cost is zero, the economy becomes very close to the standard New Keynesian
models.
However, when the marginal cost is higher, the amount of lending in response
to an interest rate cut becomes smaller, and this affects the amount of labor for each type
and thus outputs become smaller. Also, this dampening effects becomes larger when the
households heterogeneity is larger. This is in sharp contrast with the case when there
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are no financial frictions in that the households heterogeneity does not affect the effects
of monetary policy with the perfect financial market. These results hold not only for
current interest cuts but also for forward guidance.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, the relevant literature are reviewed.
Section 3 lays out the model. In section 4, quantitative experiments are conducted, and
the results are shown. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
There are several papers which analyzed the relationship between monetary
policy and financial frictions. Many of them, however, focused on how monetary policy
effects are amplified with financial frictions. Bernanke et al. (1999) introduced financial
frictions between entrepreneurs and lenders and showed that the effects of monetary
policy on economic variables such as output and investment becomes larger with finan-
cial accelerator channel. Gertler and Karadi (2011) finds the same result when they
introduce financial frictions between financial intermediaries and lenders.
Woodford (2010) analyzes the effects of monetary policy in a static IS-MP
model with the explicit financial sector. The paper makes a case that monetary policy
affects less when the financial sector is unwilling to supply credit. Curdia and Woodford
(2016) introduced a financial sector into otherwise a standard New Keynesian model
and analyzes the optimal monetary policy.
This paper analyzes the effects of monetary policy when the financial sector
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is disrupted using a model similar to Curdia and Woodford (2016). Doing this will
generalize the claim in Woodford (2010) that monetary policy affects under financial
disruption into standard dynamic monetary models which are widely used for monetary
policy analyses. Also, this paper analyzes the effects of forward guidance.
One important difference in this paper is that households heterogeneity comes
from the marginal cost of working instead of the degree of elasticity of intertemporal
substitution as in Curdia and Woodford (2016). When the heterogeneity comes from
the degree of elasticity of intertemporal substitution, borrowers are more willing to
substitute consumption across time compared to lenders in response to an interest rate
change. This might not square with data when borrowers are associated with being
poorer. In that case, borrowers care more about the current period and does not have
incentive to save a lot in response to an interest rate increase. Also, in their model, the
steady-state consumption is higher for borrowers, but this also does not have empirical
support.
On the other hand, when the heterogeneity comes from the marginal cost of
labor, steady-state consumption is smaller for borrowers, and borrowers do not have
higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In this economy, there is always some
households or agents who are poorer at earning or generating internal funds. When
the financial market is functioning, this is not a problem because these agents simply
have to borrow and lenders are willing to lend. However, when the financial sector is
disrupted, this channel becomes broken and these agents with poorer ability to earn
cannot spend much. This might be a situation similar to financial crises.
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3.3 The Model
The model is a New Keynesian model with the financial sector based on Curdia
and Woodford (2016). The model is appealing because it generates finance needs and
the financial sector plays a role while it still nests the standard New Keynesian model.
One crucial aspect of the model is that there are two types of households
and each household switch their types stochastically over time. Type is denoted by
τ ∈ {b, s}. In equilibrium, type b households borrow and type s households saves. Each
agent draws a lottery with probability 1 − δ each period. When they draw a lottery,
each agent becomes type b with probability pib and type s with probability pis, and
pib + pis = 1. The probability of becoming each type is independent of the type before
the lottery.
The difference of two types comes only from different marginal disutility of
labor. The functional form is assumed to be
vτ (hτt (j)) =
ψτ
1 + ν
[hτt (j)]
1+ν , (3.1)
where hτt (j) is the amount of labor supplied by type τ for firm j. I assume that marginal
disutility of labor is higher for type b given the same level of labor, and thus the steady-
state level of labor amount becomes smaller for tybe b. As a result, the steady-state
level of consumption is lower for type b.1 The relationship between the marginal cost
and labor hours at the steady state is shown in the appendix.
1Curdia and Woodford (2016) also assume that there is heterogeneity in the marginal cost of working.
However, on top of that, they assume that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is higher for type
b. As a result, the steady-state level of consumption is lower for type s.
58
Following Curdia and Woodford (2016), I assume that households have access
to state state-contingent insurance through which they can insure away idiosyncratic
risk. However, they can receive transfer from the insurance agency only when they draw
a lottery and before their type will be revealed. By this assumption, we can avoid the
situation that households’ respective marginal utilities do not diverge, and we can rely
on local methods. Also, this implies that in any period, all households of a given type
have the same marginal utility.
These assumption captures a following situation. For some households who
became type b today, it is more costly to earn for some duration and the opposite holds
for type s. However, since the probability of each type is independent of the current
type and because of the insurance, their expected marginal disutility and the starting
wealth at the transfer are the same across agents. As a result, type b household want
to borrow because their marginal disutility of labor is relatively lower than expected
marginal disutility for some duration and the opposite holds for type s.
Another crucial aspect of the model is that it is costly for the financial sector
to extend loans. To make real loan bt, the financial intermediaries have to use real
resources Ξt(bt). As a result, the interest rate borrowers pay, i
b
t becomes higher than
the deposit rate, idt . We implicitly define credit spread ωt as follows,
1 + ibt = (1 + ωt)(1 + i
d
t ). (3.2)
The perfectly competitive loan market and the deposit market imply that the equilib-
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rium credit spread is given by
ωt(bt) = Ξ
′
t(bt). (3.3)
In standard New Keynesian model, Ξ′(b) = 0 and thus ω = 0. One of the feature of
financial distress can be characterized by high marginal cost of extending loans. The
functional form is assumed to be Ξt(bt) = Ξ˜tb
η
t .
3.3.1 Equilibrium Conditions
Each household maximizes utility subject to consumption, labor, and private
bond holding. The Euler equation for type b is
λbt = (1 + i
d
t )(1 + ωt)βEt
[
(δ + (1− δ)pib)
λbt+1
Πt+1
+ (1− δ)(1− pib)
λst+1
Πt+1
]
, (3.4)
where λbt , λ
s
t is the marginal utility of consumption for type b and s respectively, and
Πt+1 is the gross inflation rate. Because of the insurance, all households of a given type
have the same marginal utility. The Euler equation for type s is
λst = (1 + i
d
t )βEt
[
(1− δ)pib
λbt+1
Πt+1
+ (δ + (1− δ)(1− pib))
λst+1
Πt+1
]
. (3.5)
By aggregating debt of borrowers, the law of motion of aggregate real private debt is
(1 + pibωt)bt = pib(1− pib)B(λbt , λst , Yt,∆t)− pibbgt
+ δ(bt−1(1 + ωt−1) + pibb
g
t−1)
1 + idt−1
Πt
, (3.6)
where bgt is the government debt, and Bt(λ
b
t , λ
s
t , Yt,∆t) is an auxiliary variable, which
will be defined later.
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Firms have isoelastic production function for their differentiated goods, Yt(j) =
Ztht(j)
1/φ. Under the assumption of infrequent price adjustment opportunity a la Calvo
(1983), the optimal pricing implies that the law of motion of price is
1− αΠθ−1t
1− α =
(
Ft
Kt
) θ−1
1+ωyθ
, (3.7)
where α is the probability of no price resetting opportunity, Ft and Kt are auxiliary
variables, ωy ≡ φ(1 + ν) − 1, and θ is the elasticity of substitution across differenti-
ated goods. The law of motion of price dispersion, ∆t, under the infrequent pricing
opportunity is
∆t = α∆t−1Π
θ(1+ωy)
t + (1− α)
(
1− αΠθ−1t
1− α
) θ(1+ωy)
θ−1
. (3.8)
As already discussed, the equilibrium credit spread, ωt, is given by
ωt = ηΞ˜tb
η−1
t . (3.9)
The good market clearing condition is
Yt = pibC¯
b
t (λ
b
t)
−σ + (1− pib)C¯st (λst )−σ + Ξ˜tbηt +Gt, (3.10)
where σ is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and Gt is the
government spending.
Lastly, the central bank is assumed to follow a Taylor rule,
1 + idt
1 + i¯
=
(
Πt
Π¯
)φpi (Yt
Y¯
)φy
eεm . (3.11)
The definition of auxiliary variables, {Bt, Ft,Kt} are defined in the Appendix.
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3.4 Simulations and Results
3.4.1 Calibration
Now we simulate an economy to analyze how the effects of monetary policy
depends on the conditions of the financial sector. The calibration of parameters are
summarized in Table 1.
Parameters Description Values
φ Inverse of concavity of production function 1/0.75
δ Probability of not drawing a new type 0.5
pib Probability of type b 0.5
ν Inverse of Frisch elasticity 1
θ Elasticity of demand 7.66
α Probability of no resetting price opportunity 0.66
β Discount factor 0.99
σ Average Relative risk aversion 6.25
σbs Ratio of Relative risk aversion of borrowers to lenders 1
η Marginal cost of extending loans {1, 51}
hbs Ratio of borrowers’ steady-state labor to lenders’ {0.01, 0.9}
Table 3.1: Parameter Values
There are two key parameters in the exercises. The first parameter, η, governs
how costly it is for the financial sector to extend loans. When η = 1, the spread will be
zero as in the standard New Keynesian models.
The other key parameter, hbs, governs the degree of households heterogeneity.
When the value is unity, there is no heterogeneity in households. When this value
becomes smaller, borrowers become poorer to generate internal funds.
Two other parameters we have to pay attention is the probability of not draw-
ing a new type, δ, and the ratio of the inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substitution
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between borrowers and lenders, σbs. When δ is close to 0, the model becomes closer
to the standard New Keynesian model because the current type does not persist in the
long periods.2 The other parameter is σbs. In this paper, we do not allow heterogeneity
in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
The exercises of interest is to compare the case with and without financial
disruption. This can be captured by different values of η. For all of the cases, we will
see the effects of an 1% (annualized) interest rate cut.
3.4.2 Results
The results are shown in Figure 1. When the financial sector is less constrained
(η = 1), an 1% interest rate cut increases the output by 1.55% and the inflation rate
by 0.15% annually. However, when the financial sector is more constrained (η = 51), it
increases the output only by 1% and the inflation rate by 0.095%.
For both of these cases, the amount of borrowing increases in response to an
interest rate cut. However, when the value of δ becomes very close to one, the amount
of borrowing decreases as in Curdia and Woodford (2016). But even in their paper,
when the value of δ becomes lower, the amount of borrowing increases. Since there
is no strong reasons to believe that the value δ is very close to unity, it is important
to analyze the case in which δ is away from unity and thus the amount of borrowing
increases.3
2Curdia and Woodford (2016) use a very high value of δ(= 0.95), but for some parameterization, the
sign of borrowing in response to monetary policy shock switches when δ is close to one. As explained
in the text, when δ is close to zero, the model becomes closer to the standard New Keynesian models,
so I conservatively choose a low value of δ.
3Curdia and Woodford (2016) do not allow huge heterogeneity in the marginal cost of working. When
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Figure 3.1: Impulse Response to an Interest Rate Cut
To look closely how the degree of households heterogeneity matters, I repeat
the exercise with different parameters of the marginal cost of working. The result is
in Figure 2. As we can see, the dampening effect becomes larger when the degree
of households heterogeneity increases. When the economy relies more on borrowing,
financial distress reduces the effects of monetary policy
In contrast, when the financial sector is not financially constrained, the degree
of households heterogeneity does not affect how monetary policy affects the economy
δ is low, the amount of borrowing in the economy becomes very small, and there is little implications
for financial disruption. This is not the case in this paper because the steady-state hours of working
can be different across types.
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Figure 3.2: Impulse Response to an Interest Rate Cut: Different Degree of Households
Heterogeneity
(the figure is not shown). When η = 1, regardless of the value of hbs, the output
increases by 1.55% and the inflation by 0.15%.
Also, to see more about the mechanism, Figure 3 shows how the effects of
monetary policy depends on the marginal cost of working for both type. When there
is no financial friction, the impulse response looks almost the same. However, when
there is a financial friction, the interest rate cut affects less when the marginal cost of
working is high for both types. This is likely to be because borrowing and working is a
substitute for funding. When the marginal cost of working is higher, agents rely more
on borrowing. However, when the financial friction is high, borrowing becomes also
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Response to an Interest Rate Cut: Different Degree of Marginal
Cost of Working
costly and spending responds less to the interest rate cut.
3.4.3 Forward Guidance Case
Since one of the advantage of this model is the dynamic feature, I will also
analyze how the effects of forward guidance depends on the condition of the financial
sector. I repeat a similar exercise, but now the interest rate cut will occur in four
quarters ahead.4
4Since we assume that the central bank follows a Taylor rule, giving a monetary policy shock in four
quarters ahead will lead to an endogenous response of the interest rate in the first four quarters. To
isolate the endogenous response of the interest rate, I give monetary policy shocks in such a way that
the interest rate in the first four quarters do not move. See Figure 4 for the behavior of the interest
rate.
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The result is show in Figure 4. In response to an announcement to cut the
annualized interest by 1%, both the output and inflation increases in the current period.
When the financial sector is less constrained, the forward guidance increases the output
by 4.30% and the annualized inflation rate by 1.21%. On the contrary, when the financial
sector is constrained, it increases the output by 0.73% and the inflation rate by 0.34%.
As a result, we can also see the dampening effect for forward guidance too.
One of the biggest difference comes from the response of the private bonds.
Of course, the magnitude is much smaller in the case with financial friction. Moreover,
without financial friction, the peak of the borrowing occurs before the actual interest
rate cut, but this is not the case with financial friction. The differences of the output
and the inflation rate across different degree of financial friction somewhat resemble
those across the different degree of how forward-looking the economy are as in Sukeda
(2019).
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Figure 3.4: Impulse Response to Forward Guidance
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3.5 Conclusions
The paper analyzed how the condition of financial sector affects the effects of
monetary policy. In the model, households are heterogeneous in their marginal cost
of working. This generates a nontrivial role of lending. When the financial market
is perfect, the households heterogeneity does not affect the effects of monetary policy.
However, once it becomes costly for the financial sector to extend loans, the effects of
monetary policy becomes smaller. This dampening becomes larger when the households
heterogeneity becomes larger. These results also hold for forward guidance.
In this paper, the cost of extending loans is given exogenously. To analyze the
complementarity between monetary policy and other instruments to help the financial
sector, we need to derive the cost of extending loans from an optimization problem of
the financial sector. Doing this also sheds light on quantitative severity of financial
sector in financial crises.
Also, as for forward guidance puzzle, how heterogeneous agents models can
amplify or dampen the effects of forward guidance are well-studied in models with
hand-to-mouth agents. However, very little is known when the tightness of borrowing
is endogenous. This model might be good to start with.
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Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Appendix 1: Derivations
A.1.1 Details of Solving the Model
Equilibrium conditions can be summarized in a matrix form. Under forward
guidance for one period, they become Ax = b, where
A =

1− βs −κ 0 0 −β(1− s) 0 0
−s σ(1− s) 0 0 −(1− s) −(1− s)σ 1
−βs 0 1 −κ −β(1− s) 0 0
−s −σs 0 σ −(1− s) −σ(1− s) 0
0 0 −βM2 0 1− βM2q −κ 0
0 0 −(1− q) −σM1(1− q)/ξ −q σ(1−M1q)/ξ 0
κ λ 0 0 0 0 0

,
x =
[
pin xn pie1 xe1 piz xz in
]′
,
b =
[
0 ρ 0 ρ 0 rz 0
]′
.
This can be solved for x by x = A−1b.
This can be generalized for any period k of forward guidance. Under forward
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guidance for two periods, the equilibrium conditions become Ax = b, where
A =
1− βs −κ 0 0 0 0 −β(1− s) 0 0
−s σ(1− s) 0 0 0 0 −(1− s) −(1− s)σ 1
−βs 0 1 −κ 0 0 −β(1− s) 0 0
−s −σs 0 σ 0 0 −(1− s) −σ(1− s) 0
0 0 βs 0 1 −κ −β(1− s) 0 0
0 0 −s −σs 0 σ −(1− s) −σ(1− s) 0
0 0 0 0 −βM2 0 1− βM2q −κ 0
0 0 0 0 −(1− q) −σM1 (1−q)ξ −q σ (1−M1q)ξ 0
κ λ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

,
x =
[
pin xn pie2 xe2 pie1 xe1 piz xz in
]′
,
b =
[
0 ρ 0 ρ 0 ρ 0 rz 0
]′
.
By comparing these two cases, we can see the rule for generalization. For the first two
rows, the first two columns and the last three columns are identical across these two
cases. Other columns are all zeros. The last row is identical across these two cases. For
the last two rows after removing the very last row, the last five columns are the same
across these two cases. Other columns are all zeros.
In the middle rows, the last three columns are the same across these two cases.
76
For other columns, we can see that two matrices show up in different columns. These
matrices are  −βs 0
−s −σs
 ,
 1 −κ
0 σ
 .
The other columns are all zeros. With this rule, we can solve for forward guidance for
any period.
We can solve for loss functions in a similar way. Under forward guidance for
one period, conditions for loss functions are By = d, where
B =

1− βs 0 −β(1− s)
−βs 1 −β(1− s)
0 −β(1− q) 1− βq
 ,
y =
[
Ln Le1 Lz
]′
,
d =
[
1
2(pi
2
n + x
2
n)
1
2(pi
2
e1 + x
2
e1)
1
2(pi
2
z + x
2
z)
]′
.
Under forward guidance for two periods, conditions for loss functions are By =
d, where
B =

1− βs 0 0 −β(1− s)
−βs 1 0 −β(1− s)
0 −βs 1 −β(1− s)
0 0 −β(1− q) 1− βq

,
y =
[
Ln Le2 Le1 Lz
]′
,
d =
[
1
2(pi
2
n + x
2
n)
1
2(pi
2
e2 + x
2
e2)
1
2(pi
2
e1 + x
2
e1)
1
2(pi
2
z + x
2
z)
]′
.
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Again we can see the rule for generalization. For the first row, the first, and the last
column are the same across these two cases and other columns are all zeros. For the
last row, the last two columns are the same across these two cases and other columns
are all zeros.
For the middle rows, the last columns are identical. For other columns, we can
see a matrix showing up in different columns. The matrix is
[
−βs 1
]
.
The rest of the columns are all zeros. In this way, we can calculate the loss functions
under forward guidance for any period.
A.2 Appendix 2: Details of Regaining Case
When we change an assumption on punishment, we have to solve the model
again because economy depends on expected future variables and future variables de-
pend on monetary policy in the future. The model is already solved for optimal discre-
tionary case and forward guidance for period k, so output gap, inflation rate, and loss
functions for these cases are available.
A.2.1 Discretionary Case with Regaining Credibility
A.2.1.1 Economic Variables
First, we will solve for the economic outcome with discretionary policy when
regaining probability is positive, φ > 0. Superscript “d” stands for discretionary policy
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as in Walsh (2018). Superscript r stands for “regain”. The equations for “bad” state
look almost identical except that all of the variables have superscripts r (when M1 =
M2 = 1). Even though these equations look almost identical to Walsh (2018), they
are not identical because there is a positive probability of regaining credibility once the
economy goes back to “good” state.
xd,rz = M1Etxt+1 +
1
σ
(Etpit+1 + rz)
= M1qx
d,r
z +M1(1− q)xd,rn +
1
σ
(qpid,rz + (1− q)pid,rn + rz) (A.1)
pid,rz = βM2Etxt+1 + κx
d,r
z
= βM2qpi
d,r
z + βM2(1− q)pid,rn + κxd,rz (A.2)
The equations for “good” state looks more different because there is a proba-
bility φ that the central bank regains credibility.
xd,rn = M1Etxt+1 −
1
σ
(in − Etpit+1 − ρ)
= M1sφx
FG(1)
n +M1s(1− φ)xd,rn +M1(1− s)xd,rz
− 1
σ
(in − (sφpiFG(1)n + s(1− φ)d,rpin + (1− s)pid,rz − ρ) (A.3)
pid,rn = βM2Etpit+1 + κx
d,r
n
= βM2(sφpi
FG(1)
n + s(1− φ)pid,rn + (1− s)pid,rz ) + κxd,rn (A.4)
The economy starts with these variables when this was the period when the central bank
reneged on the promise or when the central bank has not been regaining credibility yet
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since they broke the promise.
Some comments on these equations are that I used two operational assumptions
mentioned in the summary part. There is no chance of regaining credibility in the
period when the central bank reneged on forward guidance, and there is no chance of
regaining credibility if the central bank has not regained credibility while the economy
is at “good” state. The first assumption simply enables us to treat the first period of
breaking promise equally. The second assumption reduces the cases to consider a lot,
and these cases carry a very small probability of occurring.
When the economy is at “good” state, there are three possibility in the next
state. (i)With probability sφ, the economy is still in “good” state, and the central bank
regains credibility. (ii)With probability s(1 − φ), the economy is still in “good” state,
but the central bank does not regain credibility yet. (iii)With probability 1 − s, the
economy goes into “bad” state and in this case, there is no chance to regain credibility.
With probability sφ, the economy is still “good” and the central bank re-
gained credibility. In the above example, output gap and inflation rate have superscript
“FG(1)”, but this depends on another assumption on credibility that credibility must be
checked recursively. In the case of Walsh (2018), we should calculate these for “FG(k)”
because in Walsh (2018) discretionary case serves as an alternative policy for forward
guidance for any period k. In the case of recursive credibility, discretionary policy serves
as an alternative policy only for forward guidance with period 1.
Given xFG(1) and pi
FG(1)
n calculated already, we have 4 unknowns and 4 equa-
tions and we can solve for xd,rz , pi
d,r
z , x
d,r
n , pi
d,r
n .
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When φ = 0, these equations are identical to Walsh (2018).
A.2.1.2 Loss Function
Once equations for economic variables are understood, the equations for loss
functions are straightforward. Loss functions with possibility of regaining credibility are
Ld,rz = ((pi
d,r
z )
2 + λ(xd,rz )
2) + βqLd,rz + β(1− q)Ld,rn , (A.5)
Ld,rn = ((pi
d,r
n )
2 + λ(xd,rn )
2)
+ βsφLFG(1)n + βs(1− φ)Ld,rn + β(1− s)Ld,rz . (A.6)
Given L
FG(1)
n calculated already, we have 2 unknowns and 2 equations and we can solve
for Ld,rz and L
d,r
n . As we expect, since LFG1n < L
d,r
n , loss functions will be closer to zero
when φ is larger. When φ = 0, these equations are identical to Walsh (2018).
A.2.2 Forward Guidance for One Period with Regaining Credibility
A.2.2.1 Economic Variables
Equations at “bad” state looks the same as discretionary case.
xFG(1),rz = M1Etxt+1 +
1
σ
(Etpit+1 + rz)
= M1qx
FG(1),r
z +M1(1− q)xFG(1),rn +
1
σ
(qpiFG(1),rz + (1− q)piFG(1),rn + rz)
(A.7)
piFG(1),rz = βM2Etxt+1 + κx
FG(1),r
z
= βM2qpi
FG(1),r
z + βM2(1− q)piFG(1),rn + κxFG(1),rz (A.8)
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We have now additional equations for exiting periods. However, because of the assump-
tion that there is no chance of regaining credibility at “exit” periods, the equations look
almost identical with standard case.
xFG(1),re = M1Etxt+1 −
1
σ
(0− Etpit+1 − ρ),
= M1Sx
FG(1),r
n +M1(1− s)xFG(1),rz +
1
σ
(spiFG(1),rn + (1− s)piFG(1),rz + ρ)
(A.9)
piFG(1),re = βM2Etpit+1 + κx
FG(1),r
e ,
= βM2spi
FG(1),r
n + β(1− s)piFG(1),rz + κxFG(1),re . (A.10)
Equations at “good” state looks the same as discretionary case.
xFG(1),rn = M1Etxt+1 −
1
σ
(in − Etpit+1 − ρ)
= M1sφx
FG(2)
n +M1s(1− φ)xFG(1),rn +M1(1− s)xFG(1),rz
− 1
σ
(in − (sφpiFG(2)n + s(1− φ)piFG(1),rn + (1− s)piFG(1),rz − ρ), (A.11)
piFG(1),rn = βM2Etpit+1 + κx
FG(1),r
n
= βM2(sφpi
FG(2)
n + s(1− φ)piFG(1),rn + (1− s)piFG(1),rz ) + κxFG(1),rn . (A.12)
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A.2.2.2 Loss Functions
Once equations for economic variables are understood, the equations for loss
functions are straightforward. Loss functions with possibility of regaining credibility are
LFG(1),rz = ((pi
FG(1),r
z )
2 + λ(xFG(1),rz )
2) + βqLFG(1),rz + β(1− q)LFG(1),re , (A.13)
LFG(1),re = ((pi
FG(1),r
e )
2 + λ(xFG(1),re )
2) + βsLFG(1),rn + β(1− s)LFG(1),rz , (A.14)
LFG(1),rn = ((pi
FG(1),r
n )
2 + λ(xFG(1),rn )
2)
+ βsφLFG(2)n + βs(1− φ)LFG(1),rn + β(1− s)LFG(1),rz . (A.15)
Given L
FG(2)
n calculated already, we have 3 unknowns and 3 equations and we can solve
for L
FG(1),r
z , L
FG(1),r
e , and L
FG(1),r
n .
A.2.3 Forward Guidance for Multiple Periods with Regaining Credi-
bility
Because of the simple structure, the cases with multiple periods follows immedi-
ately given that code for multiple-period forward guidance without regaining possibility
is automated. We only have to introduce new variables, and we do not need to modify
equations for “bad” state and “exit” periods. We only have to modify equations for “n
(non-binding)” state.
In a matrix form, equations for economic variables become (changes are high-
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lighted by underline)
1− βM2s(1− φ) −κ . . .
−s(1− φ) −σ(M1s(1− φ)− 1) . . .
. . . . . . . . .


pi
FG(k),r
n
x
FG(k),r
n
. . .

=

βM2sφpi
FG(k+1)
n
ρ+ σM1sφx
FG(k+1)
n + sφpi
FG(k+1)
n
. . .
 . (A.16)
In general, FG(k) could be d and FG(k + 1) could be any periods of forward guidance
of interest to check credibility. (In Walsh (2018) with regaining possibility, (FG(k), r)
should be (d, r) and FG(k + 1) should be FG(k).)
Equations for loss functions become (changes are highlighted by underline) 1− βs(1− φ) . . .
. . . . . .

 L
FG(k),r
n
. . .

=
 ((pi
FG(1),r
n )2 + λ(x
FG(k),r
n )2) + βsφL
FG(k+1)
n
. . .
 . (A.17)
A.3 Appendix 3: More Results
A.3.1 Different Values of M1 and M2
The effect of reducing the discounting values M1 and M2 is not monotone. The
welfare loss arising from a lack of credibility is zero when M1 and M2 are close to unity.
When M1 = M2 = 0.8, the optimal forward guidance reduces the losses from
0.200 to 0.122, which is 84% of the standard case while the optimal sustainable forward
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guidance reduces them to 0.135, which 70% of the standard case. The welfare loss
arising from a lack of credibility corresponds to 14% of the welfare gain in the standard
case. When the regaining probability is φ = 0.0125, the value becomes 27%. So, in this
case, the welfare loss arising from lack of credibility is larger than the loss arising from
the additional discounting.
As in the main text, when M1 = M2 = 0.7, the optimal forward guidance
reduces the losses from 0.200 to 0.122 while the optimal sustainable forward guidance
reduces them to 0.135. The welfare loss arising from a lack of credibility corresponds
to 15% of the welfare gain by the optimal forward guidance. When the regaining
probability is φ = 0.0125, the value becomes 23%.
When M1 = M2 = 0.6, the optimal forward guidance reduces the losses from
0.200 to 0.176, which is 25% of the standard case, while the optimal sustainable forward
guidance reduces them to 0.181, which is 20%. The welfare loss arising from a lack
of credibility corresponds to 5% of the welfare gain in the standard case. When the
regaining probability is φ = 0.0125, the value becomes 10%.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Appendix 1: Details of Numerical Results in Section
4
For the three-period case, the cumulative effects for the output gap after the
rate cut are
∆xct+10 = ∆xt+10 + ∆xt+11 + ∆xt+12 (B.1)
=
1
σ
A
(
1 +M1 +M
2
1
3
)
+
1
σ
A
(
1 +M1
3
)
+
1
σ
A
(
1
3
)
. (B.2)
When M1 = 1, it becomes
∆xt+10 =
1
σ
A
{
3
3
+
2
3
+
1
3
}
(B.3)
= 2
(
1
σ
A
)
, (B.4)
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so the cumulative effect is 100% increase for the output gap. For the inflation rate, the
cumulative effect is
∆pict+10 = ∆pit+10 + ∆pit+11 + ∆pit+12 (B.5)
=
κ
σ
A
{
(1 +M1 +M
2
2 ) + βM2(1 +M1) + (βM2)
2
3
+
(1 +M1) + βM2
3
+
1
3
}
.
(B.6)
Thus, when M1 = 1 and M2 = 1, it becomes
∆pict+10 =
κ
σ
A
{
3 + 2β + β2
3
+
2 + β
3
+
1
3
}
, (B.7)
so the cumulative effect is 232% increase for the inflation rate. The four-period case
when M1 = 1 and M2 = 1 follows the above case, and
∆xct+10 =
1
σ
A
{
4 + 3 + 2 + 1
4
}
, (B.8)
∆pict+10 =
κ
σ
A
{
4 + 3β + 2β2 + β3
4
+
3 + 2β + β2
4
+
2 + β
4
+
1
4
}
, (B.9)
so the increase is 150% for the output gap and 396% for the inflation rate.
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B.2 Appendix 2: Equilibrium conditions
The equilibrium conditions under optimal discretionary case are
pidn = βM2(spi
d
n + (1− s)pidz ) + κxdn (B.10)
xdn = M1(sx
d
n + (1− s)xdz)−
1
σ
(idn − (spidn + (1− s)pidz )− ρ) (B.11)
pidz = βM2(qpi
d
z + (1− q)pidn) + κxdz (B.12)
xdz = M1(qx
d
z + (1− q)xdn) +
1
σ
((qpidz + (1− q)pidn) + rz) (B.13)
0 = κpidn + λx
d
n. (B.14)
The equilibrium conditions under forward guidance for one period are
pifg1n = βM2(spi
fg1
n + (1− s)pifg1z ) + κxfg1n (B.15)
xfg1n = M1(sx
fg1
n + (1− s)xfg1z )−
1
σ
(ifg1n − (spifg1n + (1− s)pifg1z )− ρ) (B.16)
pifg1e = βM2(spi
fg1
n + (1− s)pifg1z ) + κxfg1e (B.17)
xfg1e = M1(sx
fg1
n + (1− s)xfg1z ) +
1
σ
((spifg1n + (1− s)pifg1z ) + ρ) (B.18)
pifg1z = βM2(qpi
fg1
z + (1− q)pifg1e ) + κxfg1z (B.19)
xfg1z = M1(qx
fg1
z + (1− q)xfg1e ) +
1
σ
((qpifg1z + (1− q)pifg1e ) + rz) (B.20)
0 = κpifg1n + λx
fg1
n . (B.21)
After calculating the economic variables, we can calculate the loss at each state
using the following conditions
Ldn = (pi
d
n)
2 + λ(xdn)
2 + βEtL
d
t+1 (B.22)
Ldz = (pi
d
z )
2 + λ(xdz)
2 + βEtL
d
t+1. (B.23)
88
By writing out the conditional expectations using the transition matrix, we obtain
Ldn = (pi
d
n)
2 + λ(xdn)
2 + β(sLdn + (1− s)Ldz) (B.24)
Ldz = (pi
d
z )
2 + λ(xdz)
2 + β(qLdz + (1− q)Ldn). (B.25)
Conditions of loss functions for forward guidance with one period are
Lfg1n = (pi
fg1
n )
2 + λ(xfg1n )
2 + β(sLfg1n + (1− s)Lfg1z ) (B.26)
Lfg1e = (pi
fg1
e )
2 + λ(xfg1e )
2 + β(sLfg1n + (1− s)Lfg1z ) (B.27)
Lfg1z = (pi
fg1
z )
2 + λ(xfg1z )
2 + β(qLfg1z + (1− q)Lfg1e ). (B.28)
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 The Relationship Between the Marginal Cost of La-
bor and Steady-State Level of Hours Worked
The optimality conditions from the households’ optimization problem yields
the intratemporal substitution between consumption and labor,
ψτ [h
τ
t (j)]
ν = λτtwt(j), (C.1)
where λτt is the marginal utility of consumption for type τ ∈ {b, s} and wt(j) is the
wage for differentiated labor type j ∈ [0, 1]. By taking the ratio of the two types,
(
hst (j)
hbt(j)
)ν
=
λst
λbt
ψb
ψs
. (C.2)
As a result, in the steady state, the higher marginal cost is associate with lower labor
hours.
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C.2 Equilibrium Conditions and Auxiliary Variables
The definition of auxiliary variables used in the equilibrium conditions are as
follows.
Kt = Λ(λ
b
t , λ
s
t )µ
pφλ˜(λbt , λ
s
t )
−1
(
Yt
Zt
)1+ωy
+ αβEt
[
Π
θ(1+ωy)
t+1 Kt+1
]
, (C.3)
Ft = Λ(λ
b
t , λ
s
t )(1− τt)Yt + αβEt
[
Πθ−1t+1Ft+1
]
, (C.4)
where µpt ≡ θ/(θ − 1),
Λ(λbt , λ
s
t ) ≡ pibλbt + (1− pib)λst , (C.5)
and
λ˜(λbt , λ
s
t ) ≡
[
pib
(
λbt
ψb
) 1
ν
+ (1− pib)
(
λst
ψs
) 1
ν
]ν
. (C.6)
B(λbt , λ
s
t , Yt,∆t) ≡ C¯bt [λbt ]−σ − C¯st [λst ]−σ
−
[(
λbt
ψb
) 1
ν
−
(
λst
ψs
) 1
ν
](
λ˜t
)− 1+ν
ν
(
Yt
Zt
)1+ωy
∆t. (C.7)
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